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Notes and Comments
FREEDOM OF SPEECH-GROUP LIBEL-BEAUHARNAIS V.
PEOPLE OF STATE OF ILLINOIS
Hitler proved before a world jury the potential power for the
creation of evil bound up in deliberate, systematic defamation of a
class of people. In his scheming rise to power, defamation ranked high
as an effective political weapon. It is possible that facts like these led
the Supreme Court in Beauharnais v. People of the State of lllinois1
to narrow further the range of protection from state interference with
speech and the press guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. By a five-to-four decision, the Court up-
held as constitutional an Illinois statute which makes it a crime to
publish defamatory matter directed at certain classes of citizens.2
The crime has been tagged "group libel". Because the case apparently
represents the final emergence of an attitude toward freedom of
speech which has been in evidence over the last several years, and
because the case presents a reasonably good opportunity to determine
the individual views of the present Justices on freedom of speech
issues, a detailed analysis of the facts and opinions is warranted.
The statute under which the defendant Beauharnais was convicted
provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person . . . to manufacture,
sell ... present or exhibit in any public place in this state any litho-
graph, moving picture, play, drama or sketch, which publication or
exhibition portrays depravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue
of a class of citizens, of any race, color, creed, or religion which said
publication or exhibition exposes the citizens of any race, color, creed,
or religion to contempt, derision or obloquy or which is productive of
breach of the peace or riots...."3 Beauharnais circulated a leaflet in
the form of a petition to the mayor of Chicago, "to halt the further en-
croachment, harassment, and invasion of white people . . .by the
Negro." Also contained in the leaflet was an appeal to whites to unite,
exclaiming, "If persuasion ... will not unite us, then the aggressions
... rapes, robberies, knives, guns and marijuana of the negro, surely
will." The information under which Beauharnais was tried charged,
in the terms of the statute, that he "did unlawfully . .. exhibit in
1343 U.S. 250 (1952).
'The majority: Vinson, C. J., Frankfurter, Burton, Minton and Clark, JJ.;
Dissenting: Black, Douglas, Reed and Jackson, J.J.
'ILL. REv. STAT. c. 38, sec. 471 (1949).
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public places, lithographs, which publications portray depravity, crimi-
nality, unchastity or lack of virtue of citizens of the Negro race and
color and which exposes [sic] citizens of ... the Negro race and color
to contempt, derision or obloquy...."
In the trial court, the judge simply instructed the jury that if they
found the defendant had distributed the leaflet they were to return a
verdict of guilty. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Illinois treated the
crime as "criminal libel" and affirmed the conviction, holding that the
lower court had treated it as such and had correctly disposed of the
defense of truth published with good motives, as provided by the
Illinois Constitution for all cases of libel, according to ordinary
criminal libel precedents. 4
In the Supreme Court of the United States, Beauharnais challenged
the statute as being a violation of the liberty of speech and the press
guaranteed him by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. He contended also that the statute was unconstitutionally vague
under the same clause. In determining the validity of these objec-
tions the Court, in an opinion delivered by Justice Frankfurter, drew
an analogy between the Illinois crime and criminal libel. directed at
an individual. The latter existed at common-law, was thus a crime in
the colonies, and presently exists either under common-law or by
statute in all forty-eight states, the three territories and the District
of Columbia. No doubt of the constitutionality of the crime exists.
The Court then examined the definitions of criminal libel in the
states having the crime by statute and found that, with minor varia-
tions, the definitions followed a pattern closely resembling the terms
used in the Illinois group libel statute.5
Interpreting the statute as nothing more than a criminal libel
statute, the only difference being that the libel was directed at a huge
group instead of at an individual, the Court concluded:
"... if an utterance directed at an individual may be the
object of criminal sanctions, we cannot deny to a State power to
'People v. Beauharnais, 408 MI1. 512, 97 N.E. 2d 343 (1951).5 Out of 23 jurisdictions having a statutorily defined crime of libel, the court
found that eleven had the following general formula: "'A libel is a malicious
defamation, expressed either by printing, or by signs or pictures ...tending to
blacken the memory of one who is dead, or to impeach the honesty, integrity,
virtue, or reputation or publish the natural defects of one who is alive and thereby
to expose him to public hatred, contempt, ridicule, or financial injury."' The
remaining twelve jurisdictions had the following general version: "'A libel is a
malicious defamation of a person, made public by any printing, writing, sign,
picture, representation, or effigy, tending to provoke him to wrath or expose him to
public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or to deprive him of the benefits of public
confidence and social intercourse.... .. Beauharnais v. People of the State of
Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 255 note 5 (1952).
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punish the same utterance directed at a defined group, unless we can
say that this is a wilful and purposeless restriction unrelated to the
peace and well-being of the State."6
Relying further on the analogy to ordinary criminal libel, the Court
found that the crime as defined was not so vague as to violate the
Fourteenth Amendment, and that the procedure adopted in the Illinois
courts was proper. By the same reasoning, the clear and present
danger test was held to have no application.
Four major objections to the majority opinion were registered by
the four dissenting Justices.
The Interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment
Justices Black and Douglas disagreed with the majority's interpreta-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment. Nowhere in the majority opinion
is the First Amendment specifically mentioned as having any bearing
on the decision. Herein lies the major difference between the majority
and Justices Black and Douglas. In his dissent, Justice Black said:
"Without distortion, this First Amendment could not
possibly be read so as to hold that Congress has power to punish
Beauharnais and others for petitioning Congress as they have here
sought to petition the Chicago authorities. (citation omitted) And we
have held in a number of prior cases that the Fourteenth Amendment
makes the specific prohibitions of the First Amendment equally ap-
plicable to the states."'
On the other hand, the majority opinion reads:
"The precise question before us, then, is whether the
protection of 'liberty' in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment prevents a State from punishing such libels ..... ,8
The commands of the First Amendment in regard to speech and the
press are not conclusive so far as state legislation regarding defamatory
language is concerned. Thus the majority accepts what Justice Black
terms the "reasonableness test." That is, if the state laws abridging
speech or the press are found to have a "rational basis" they are
sustained. Or in the words of the majority, the statute, making de-
famatory language the basis for punishment, must be sustained "unless
we can say that this is a wilful and purposeless restriction unrelated
to the peace and well-being of the State." Justice Douglas, though
concurring with Justice Black, wrote a separate opinion in which he
expressed the view that freedom of speech is guaranteed by the First
'Beauharnais v. People of the State of Illinois, 343 U. S. 250, 258 (1952).
Id. at 268.
s d. at 258.
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Amendment in absolute terms and therefore has a preferred position
unlike, for example, the right of privacy guaranteed by the Fourth
Amendment.
"Until recent years that had been the course and direction
of constitutional law. Yet recently the Court in this and in other cases
has engrafted the right of regulation onto the First Amendment by
placing in the hands of the legislative branch the right to regulate
'within reasonable limits' the right of free speech. This to me is an
ominous and alarming trend."'
The present case, then, seems to settle firmly the principle that the
Fourteenth Amendment protects speech and the press from state
interference only so far as is necessary to preserve the "concept of
ordered liberty", the test adopted for other guaranties arising from
the due process clause.10 This is abandonment of the theory proposed
by Justices Black and Douglas which was accepted by a majority of
the Court as recently as 1944 and which would incorporate the First
Amendment into the Fourteenth, making it applicable to the states.'1
With the acceptance of the "rational basis" test, the theory that
speech occupies a "preferred status" must also be rejected. And
whatever the weight previously given the elusive doctrine that the
presumption of constitutionality does not apply to statutes restricting
speech or the press, as it does to other statutes, that weight is no longer
on the scale.'2
This aspect of the case is better settled than the five-to-four
decision would indicate. Justice Jackson dissented on different grounds
and expressly agrees that the Fourteenth Amendment does not in-
corporate the First.'3 The question of vagueness aside, Justice Reed
agrees that the Constitution does not forbid the state to pass this
type of statute. If he agrees with the other dissenting Justices, who
9 Id. at 285.0 See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 324, 325 (1937).
'
1See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, 529, 530 (1944). See also West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnett, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1942), where
it was said, "The test of legislation which collides with the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, because it also collides with the principles of the First, is much more
definite than the test when only the Fourteenth is involved. Much of the vagueness
of the due process clause disappears when the specific prohibitions of the First
become its standard. The right of a State to regulate, for example, a public
utility may well include, so far as the due process test is concerned, power to
impose all of the restrictions which a legislature may have a 'rational basis' for
adopting. But freedoms of speech and of press, of assembly, and of worship may
not be infringed on such slender grounds."
That the presumption of constitutionality does not apply to statutes re-
stricting speech first appeared in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304
U. S. 144, 152 note 4 (1938). It was reasserted in Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S.
516, 529 (1944).
", Beauharnais v. People of State of Illinois, 343 U. S. 250, 287-295 (1952).
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believe that Congress could not constitutionally pass such a law, he
must concede that the Fourteenth Amendment does not incorporate
the First. However, Justice Reed said in his opinion,
"This conviction must stand or fall upon a determination
whether all the definitions of the acts proscribed by the statute and
charged in the information may be banned under the principles of the
First Amendment." (Italics writer's)
Just what the italicized words mean is unclear. They could mean
that the specific commands of the First Amendment are the guide;
more likely, they mean that the "principles of the First Amendment"
are carried over as guides in determining what the word 'liberty"
of the Fourteenth Amendment demands.
Vagueness
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment not only
guarantees within limits certain substantive rights to citizens such as
the right to speak freely or to contract for the acquisition of property, 5
but it also guarantees that in the few instances when a citizen can be
deprived of these rights, such deprivation will be constitutional only
if it is carried out with certain procedural safeguards. One of these
safegurads is that if a statutory crime is the basis of conviction, the
crime must be so defined as to apprise reasonable men of what may be
foreseen to be found illicit under the statute.1 Shading into sub-
stantive due process, this procedural requirement demands that the
statute as relied upon for the conviction must not be so broad "as to
permit within the scope of its language the punishment of incidents
fairly within the protection of the guarantee of free speech."' 7
Justice Reed, dissenting in the present case, pointed out that
Beauhamais' conviction flowed from the information as a whole, the
trial judge ruling as a matter of law that the defendant was guilty as
charged. Thus each and every portion of the information must be
constitutional for there is no way to determine under which portion
the trial judge found Beauharnais guilty.'8 Since the disjunctive was
used in the information ("which publications portray depravity, crimi-
nality, unchastity, or lack of virtue"), the conviction might rest on
portrayal of any one of these vices. "Our examination can begin and
end with the inquiry as to what meaning lies in the act's declaration,
1" Id. at 281.
"West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 800 U. S. 879 (1937).
"Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 848 U. S. 495 (1952).
Winters v. New York, 838 U. S. 507, 509 (1948).
"See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1 (1949).
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as charged in the information, that it is unlawful to portray in a litho-
graph a 'lack of virtue of a class of citizens . . . which . . . exposes
[them to] derision, or obloquy."'9 Is such a definition so narrow
that no writing which is fairly within the protection of the Fourteenth
Amendment could serve as a basis for punishment? Does the definition
of the crime sufficiently apprise reasonable men of what may be
found to be illicit? Justice Reed answered both questions in the
negative.
The majority of the Court relied upon the long-acquiesced-in usage
of such broad terms in ordinary criminal libel statutes and upon the
Illinois courts' construction as fixing their meaning. Justice Reed
answers:
"To say that the mere presence of the word 'virtue' in the
individual libel statute makes its meaning clear in the group libel
statute is a non-sequitur. No case is cited which defines and limits
the meaning of these words.""
As to the "clarifying construction and fixed usage" which the Illinois
court put on the terms of the statute, there was simply the analogy to
criminal libel.21 The majority pointed out that the Illinois high court.
characterized the words prohibited by the statute as those "liable to
cause violence and disorder." As far as can be determined from the
opinion, however, no finding was made or necessary to be made that
the words of the defendant had this tendency. Justice Reed said that
the characterization of the Illinois court did not limit the prohibition
of the statute, but merely described the lithograph published by
Beauharnais.
"Derision" is as loose a term as "virtue". A limited search failed
to disclose one case in which "virtue" as relates to libel was defined;
nor was a case found defining "derision" in the context of libel. The
phrase "derisive words", which defined prohibited speech in a New
Hampshire statute, was held not to be too vague, but because it came
within the purview of the statute only when the plain tendency of
"derisive words" was to excite the addressee to a breach of the
peace.
22
" Beauharnais v. People of State of Illinois, 343 U. S. 250, 281 (1952).
Id. at 282.On this score, Justice Frankfurter said: "We do not, therefore, parse the
statute as grammarians or treat it as an abstract exercise in lexicography." In
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495 (1952), decided one month later
than the Beauharnais case, Justice Frankfurter, concurring, traced the meaning
of the word "sacrilegious" for 11 pages, though its meaning, whether too broad
or not, had been fixed by the New York Court of Appeals in applying the statute
challenged there.
"State v. Chaplinsky, 91 N. H. 310, 18 A. 2d 754 (1941), affirmed 315
U. S. 568 (1942).
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A New Jersey statute, similar to the Illinois statute at least in its
desired object, made it unlawful to "make... any speech ... which
... incites ... hatred, abuse, violence, or hostility against any group
...of persons ...by reason of race, color, religion or manner of
worship ... .-23 This statute was never before the Supreme Court, for
the state appellate court held it to be unconstitutional under the
federal and state constitutions. Among others, one reason for the
holding was that the words "hatred", "abuse", and "hostility" were
abstract and indefinite in meaning. 24 Concededly the terms are vague,
but it is submitted that they are no more so than the terms "virtue"
and "derision".
The Clear and Present Danger Test
A third objection registered in dissent concerned the majority's
failure to apply the clear and present danger test. Quoting an earlier
case,2 5 the majority characterized libel as being one of "'certain well-
defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and
punishment of which has never been thought to raise any Constitu-
tional problem."' The Court elaborated:
"'These [classes of speech] include the lewd and obscene,
the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or "fighting" words-those
which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an im-
mediate breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such
utterances are no essential part of an exposition of ideas ... ""
In short, the Court defined libel as not being "speech" within the
protection of the Fourteenth Amendment, comparing it to obscenity.
Not being within the area of protection, the Court rationalized, it was
unnecessary to consider the clear and present danger test.
Justice Black believed the statute unconstitutional by its terms and
thus did not reach a consideration of the clear and present danger test.
But he believed the quotation of the dicta from Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire upon which the Court relied was misplaced. The dicta
in the Chaplinsky case was written concerning a defendant convicted
for calling a man vile names face-to-face on a public street in violation
of a statute. According to Justice Black, "We pointed out in that con-
text that the use of such 'fighting words' was not an essential part of
exposition of ideas."2 7 Ordinarily, face-to-face name-calling on a pub-
' II N. J. REv. STAT., sec. 157B-5 (1937).
21 State of New Jersey v. Klapprott, 127 N. J. L. 395, 22 A. 2d 877 (1941).
Beauharnais v. People of State of Illinois, 343 U. S. 250, 255, 256 (1952),
citing Chaplinsky v. People of State of New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568 (1942).
2 6Id. at 256, 257.
Id. at 272, 273.
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lie street is not related to the expression of ideas. On the other hand,
the same is not necessarily true when one portrays a lack of virtue in a
class of citizens subjecting those citizens to derision. In Cantwell v.
Connecticut, the following observation was made:
"In the realm of religious faith, and in that of political
belief, sharp differences arise. In both fields the tenets of one man
may seem the rankest error to his neighbor. To persuade others to his
own point of view, the pleader, as we know, at times resorts to
exaggeration, to vilification of men who have been, or are, prominent
in church or state, and even to false statement. But the people of this
nation have ordained in the light of history, that, in spite of the
probability of excesses and abuses, these liberties are, in the long
view, essential to enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part
of the citizens of a democracy."n
Group libels, at least the dangerous type, are not indulged in merely
for the sake of insulting the group; their purpose is to obtain a re-
action from another class of citizens. The very fact that ideas are thus
transmitted to and implanted in the minds of many persons is what
makes this type of defamation a dangerous social and political weapon.
The lesser shades of group libel-the border line cases-are just as
closely related to, and often the means of, persuasion. Being thus re-
lated, such speech would seem to be within the protection of the Four-
teenth Amendment subject, of course, to having this protection with-
drawn if the speech presented a clear and present danger of creating
some substantive evil which the state has the right to prevent.2 9
One of the express grounds for Justice Jackson's dissent was the
majority's refusal to apply the clear and present danger test. Referring
to the test he said:
" 'The test applies and has meaning where a conviction is
sought to be based on a speech or writing which does not directly or
explicitly advocate a crime but to which such tendency is sought to be
attributed by construction or by implication from external circum-
stances.'
"Not the least of the virtues of this formula in such
tendency cases is that it compels the prosecution to make up its
mind what particular evil it sought or is seeking to prevent. It must
relate its interference with speech or press to some identifiable evil
to be prevented."'0
-s310 U. S. 296, 310 (1940).
' See Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47 (1918).
' Beauharnais v. People of State of Illinois, 343 U. S. 250, 303 (1952). Since
its birth in Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47 (1918), the clear and present
danger test has been modified so that there are now at least four different situations
involving some degree of restrictions of speech in which the test will apply dif-
ferently if at all(15 If a statute proscribes defined, specific utterances, for example, advoca-
tion of the forceful overthrow of the government, the clear and present danger
test is satisfied by an inquiry, whether the "'gravity of the evil, discounted by
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The traditional justification for making a punishable offense of libel
is its tendency to create a breach of the peace. 31 Because of this
"traditional" tendency, the Court holds that it is unnecessary that the
clear and present danger test be satisfied. Yet, a conviction resting on
violation of a statute making it unlawful to incite a breach of the
peace would probably be sustained only upon a showing that the
defendant's speech or publication presented a clear and present
danger of creating a breach of the peace. 32
It has been suggested that protection of reputation is another
reason for punishing libel.33 This is perhaps more cogent justification
for conviction for group libel than is the libels tendency to create a
breach of the peace. To the extent that libel does lower the standing
of the members of the libeled group in the confidence and respect
of the public, the majority's rationalization is more understandable.
The harm sought to be prevented occurs by the very fact of publica-
tion. Like obscenity, libel has done its damage as soon as it reaches
the minds of an audience, if libel does cause the loss of public respect
and confidence. But harm to reputation, to public standing, is specula-
tive. Seemingly innocuous publications could conceivably cause harm
to the community standing of a class of citizens. It would therefore
be some protection for future defendants under this statute to apply
Jackson's test as a "rule of reason", at least to the extent of making the
prosecution relate the "libelous" matter to some evil with factual
evidence.34
its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the
danger."' Dennis v. United States, 341 U. S. 494, 510 (1951).(2) If the offense is defined in non-speech terms, or f a conviction is basedon speech which does not directly advocate a crime, but which has that tendency
attributed to it, the test will apply as a "rule of reason". The speech would haveto be shown to have created a clear and present danger of the crime sought to be
prevented. Dennis v. United States, 341 U. S. 494, 505, 568 (1951); Cantwell v.State of Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940).
(3) If speech is not proscribed, but the time, place or mode of delivering
the speech is regulated, the Cear and present danger test does not apply. Breard
v. Alexandria, La., 341 U. S. 622 (1951); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569
(1941).(4) If the speech upon wflh conviction is based is such that no exposition
of ideas is accomplished by it and the harm sought to be prevented is caused by its
very utterance, for example, obscenity, the testrhas no application. Chaplisky v.
State of New Hampshire, 315 U. 5. 568 (1942). Beaharais v. People of State of
Illinois, 343 U. . 250 (1952). The majority o the Court place libel in category
four. Justice Jackson classifies it as falling within category two.
aPeople v. Spielman, 318 Ill. 482, 149 N.E. 466 (1925); Tracy v. Corn., 87Ky. 578, 9 S 34. 822 (1888); State v. Cramer, 193 Minn. 344, 258 N.W. 525
(1935). CHAFFEE, Gov .c -mrr Aum MASS CO~.n UNcA xONS, Vol. I, 115 (1947).( Can4vell v. Connecticut, 310 U. . 296 (1940).
"See the formula which twelve states adopted by statute supra note 5; Note,
52 COL. L. R. 521 (1952).oi eisman, Democracy and Defamation: Fair Game and Fair Conuent II, 42
COL. L. R. 1282, 1307 (1942), suggests the use of public opinion analysts to
determine the effect of group libel,
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Issues for the jury
Justice Jackson agreed with the majority in their interpretation of
the Fourteenth Amendment, that is, that the due process clause pro-
tects speech from state interference only to the extent necessary to
preserve the "concept of ordered liberty." The preservation of the
"concept of ordered liberty", however, commands more from Jackson's
viewpoint than the majority granted. In order to make the statute
constitutional, Jackson believes it would have to be applied with more
adequate procedural safeguards, among which he would list trial by
jury not only on the issue of publication, but also on the question
whether the matter charged is libelous. England has had jury trial on
issues of law and fact in libel prosecutions since the passage of Fox's
Libel Act in 1792.35 Twenty-nine of the American States have pro-
visions for broad jury powers in trials for criminal libel, 83 Twenty-
four of these states provide for jury trial of law and fact in their
constitutions, substantially, adopting the provision of the New York
Constitution37 which was inserted as a result of the leading American
case on the subject, People v. Croswell.38 This provision in the New
York Constitution represents, according to Jackson, "the common sense
of American criminal libel law."
The defense of truth, justification of the utterance as "fair com-
ment", and the privilege of redressing grievances were also dealt with
in Jackson's dissent. The majority opinion did not hold these defenses
unavailable. It held that the defendant failed in the defense of truth,
because for it to prevail, good motives must also be shown. As to the
defenses of fair comment and privilege, the Court simply held that
since the defendant failed to proffer evidence regarding them or to
raise the defenses by motion, the issue, whether the statute is constitu-
tional if these defenses were denied, was not before the Court. Thus
32 Geo. III c. 60.
For a collection of these states and the relevant codes, statutes and constitu-
tions, see Note 52 COL. L. R. 521, 528 note 20 (1952). Kentucky is among these
with the provon". . . and in all indictments for libel the jury shall have the
right to determine the law and the facts, under the direction of the court, as in
other cases." Ky. CONST. sec. 9 (1891). However, the only case found which
interprets this section allowed the judge to determine whether the matter charged
was libelous, even though it was admitted that the section was copied after Fox's
Libel Act. Valston v. Commonwealth, 32 Ky. L. REP. 535, 106 S.W. 224 (1907).
'N. Y. CONsT. Art VII, sec. 8 (182L), now N. Y. CONST. Art. I sec. 8 (1988).
3 Johns Cas. 337, 413 (N. Y. 1804). In this case, Croswell was indicted
for libeling Thomas Jefferson. The trial judge pronounced CrosweU's statements
libelous as a matter of law, leaving to the jury only the issue of publication, as the
court did in the Beauharnais case. Pending an appeal by Croswell, the public
response to the trial was such that the New York legislature quickly enacted a
statute providing that the question whether the matter charged was libelous
should be decided by the jury. "In consequence of this declaratory statute," the
New York high court unanimously awarded a new trial.
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little is settled by the case in regard to defenses to the action. Presum-
ably, if the analogy to ordinary libel is to be carried to its logical con-
clusion, any defenses which are available under the existing ordinary
criminal libel law will have to be made available to a defendant being
proscuted for the commission of group libel. Generally, defenses
which will probably apply to group libel are: (1) Truth, which must
ordinarily be as broad as the imputation of the libel, and in some states
is only a defense when published with good motives;39 (2) Privilege,
that is, that the publication was made "to protect or advance a legiti-
mate and important interest of the publisher", or of a third person;40
(3) fair comment, which is actually a type of "privilege". This defense
is defined as the right to make fair criticism of matters of public con-
cern in the form of expression of opinion, which criticism represents
the critic's honest opinion.41
Some Non-Constitutional Arguments Against the Statute
Justice Frankfurter recently wrote, "Preoccupation by our people
with the constitutionality, instead of with the wisdom, of legislation
or of executive action is preoccupation with a false value."4 2 Taking
that suggestion, it will perhaps be worthwhile briefly to consider the
wisdom of the statute under which one could conceivably be con-
victed if he (1) portrays what a judge considers a lack of virtue (2)
of a class of citizens because of race, color, creed or religion, (3) so
that the citizens are subjected to derision, (4) whether or not the
portrayal is shown to have a tendency to cause a breach of the peace,
or to lower the community standing of the citizens.
Only a pressing need for this legislation can justify such a statute.
If the need exists, the legislation, to be wise, should meet this need
with a minimum of risk that the free exchange of ideas will be unduly
checked. What protection does a huge group have in the absence
of a group libel statute? The civil action and criminal prosecution for
libel exist mainly for the protection of the individual, but certain
groups have been extended some protection. Civil actions have been
allowed when the plaintiff is a member of a large group if he can show
special application of the libel to himself. This remedy is available if
the group libeler makes the mistake of attacking a group by libeling
its leader.43 Or if the group is so small that a libel directed at it
'PROSSEn, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW, or ToRTs, 853 (1941).
40 Id. at 821.
1Id. at 841-844.
"Dennis v. United States, 341 U. S. 494, 555 (1951).
" On this subject generally, see Tanenhaus, Group Libel, 85 CoRmELL L. Q.
261 (1950).
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amounts to a libel of each member, each has a civil action. For ex-
ample, actions have been allowed when the members of a partner-
ship,44 the occupants of a house,45 a jury,46 an election board,47 and
a state board of medical examiners 48 were defamed. Actions were held
not maintainable by individuals when the "wine-joint" owners,49 pro-
prietors of correspondence schools,50 the Stivers Clan,51 and the drivers
of a taxicab company were libeled. 52 Some groups can maintain an
action for libel in their own name. A corporation can sue for libel to
protect its commercial reputation. 53 But marking the outer limits of
suits for libel in this field is a New York case allowing an unincorpo-
rated association (a trade union) to sue through its president.54 Aside
from trade unions, unincorporated associations, which approach more
closely the type of groups at which libels are directed for political
reasons, have made few attempts to maintain suit for libel, indicating
the existence of procedural difficulties.55
Criminal prosecutions have been maintained for libels directed at
broader groups than those whose members could sue in a civil action.
Convictions have been maintained, inter alia, for libels of the fourth
degree of the Knights of Columbus,5" and the American Legion.57
People v. Edmondson s is probably typical, however, of the result to
be expected when an attempt is made to stretch ordinary criminal libel
statutes to protect large racial or religious groups. Edmondson was in-
dicted for publishing libels against "all persons of the Jewish Religion."
In dismissing the indictment, the judge said:
"I have carefully read the authorities on this subject, both
in this country and in England, and it is my opinion that such an
indictment cannot be sustained under the laws of this state, and that
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no such indictment as one based upon defamatory matter directed
against a group or community so large as 'all persons of the Jewish
Religion' has ever been sustained in this or any other jurisdiction."'
Thus the Illinois statute presented in the Beauharnais case is not
merely added protection; it is all the protection of the law large groups
can presently call upon.
Does the statute afford real protection, worth the supression of
free expression necessitated by it? In regard to this question it is
interesting to compare the Beauharnais case with another case decided
during the same term of court. In Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson,0°
it was decided that a statute allowing a board of censors to ban mov-
ing pictures deemed to be "sacrilegious" imposed an unconstitutional
restraint on a free press. The Court believed that, "It is not the busi-
ness of government in our nation to supress real or imagined attacks
upon a particular religious doctrine, whether they appear in publica-
tions, speeches, or motion pictures."61 Concededly, the Beauharnais
case on its facts did not involve any religious issues. But the statute in-
cludes religion with race, creed, or color in enumerating the groups
to be protected, and repeatedly throughout the opinion of the Court,
Justice Frankfurter wrote in terms of "racial and religious groups"
indicating that the Court would not be hostile to a conviction for a
libel directed at a large religious group. Where does one draw the
line between sacrilegious utterances, and libel of a religious group
subjecting that group to derision? Apparently the difference lies be-
tween abusing the religion and abusing the members of a given sect.
But can it be said that a vituperative attack of a religion leaves its
members unharmed socially or tends any less to create a breach of
the peace? At least in the field of religion, a large range of possibly
injurious publications must be left unfettered by the statute if the
Burstyn case is to be upheld.
The same might be said of the remaining terms of the rubric,
race, color or creed. Suppose an untruthful and unjustifiable attack
is directed at the Negro race, or at the Jewish people. By the words
of the statute the publication, to be punishable, must portray "de-
pravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue" of a class of citizens.
Is the statement, all Negroes should be lynched, within the statute?
Or consider the sample of group defamation which Professor Tanen-
haus sets out in his article on the subject:
People v. Edmondson, 168 Misc. 142, 144, 4 N. Y. S. 2d 257, 260 (1938).
°343 U. S. 495 (1952).
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"There are ten million Jews in this country and one
hundred and thirty million non-jews, and yet the Jews, with their
money, are in control.
"They control the so-called 'Federal Reserve Bank' and
through it the rest of the National Banks.... All this discussion of
Republican or Democrat is useless as long as Barney Baruch controls
both. Don't waste any time on it, but face facts. It is not the choice
of Republican or Democrat, it is Nationals versus Internationalists,
Americans against America's destroyers, or to put it very plainly, Jews
versus Gentile ... ."
Is that statement punishable under the statute? It probably is not and
shrewd defamers could take advantage of that fact. Paradoxically, the
better a statute is from the standpoint of protection the more dangerous
it is to the free exchange of ideas, and consequently, the less likely
it is to withstand the test of constitutionality.
Other factors give rise to doubts as to the wisdom of a statute at-
tempting to control group libel. For example, truth is a defense to
prosecution under the Illinois statute but truth is not defined. Beau-
harnais would have no trouble proving that some negroes did rob,
rape, carry guns and knives, and smoke marijuana. He could show the
same facts if it were the white race involved, or the Catholic, Jewish
or Protestant religion. Such proof does not justify the imputation of
these crimes to the whole race, but the problem of what is truth could
be troublesome in a less extreme situation. All the issues become less
clear in a group libel case than in a case of individual libel.63
In attempting to prove the truth, a defendant could bring hate
literature into the courtroom by the carload. The courtroom would be
turned into a sounding board for his views. And at least in a juris-
diction that allows reasonable and honest belief in the truth of the
matter charged, the defendant would not have too much difficulty
convincing a jury of this reasonable belief. The very seriousness of
group defamation results from the fact that so much of it is apparently
believed. If it is not believed, group libel statutes are unnecessary. 64
Another problem under group libel statutes is the difficulty of ob-
taining convictions where clearly warranted. If the definition of the
crime is sufficiently narrow to be constitutional, acquittals will result
in many cases. If the defendant had been left free to peddle his false
ideas, the ideas might have withered in the market place from lack of
buyers. But if he is tried and acquitted, his ideas are impressed into
the minds of many with the stamp of truth of the courtroom.65
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Whether he is convicted or not, the issues are brought more vividly
before the public and the town becomes divided pro and con.
Another real objection is that prosecutions for group libels may
depend largely on the affiliations of the district attorney and his staff
or their susceptibility to political pressures of strong minority groups.
If prosecutions are brought, whatever the result, the effect will prob-
ably be unsatisfactory. If the defendant wins, his position is merely
strengthened and he becomes more arrogant. His followers are en-
couraged. If the defendant loses, the sentence will be short or the
fine light. He becomes a martyr and his followers become more con-
temptible of democratic processes. 6
Because of these factors and others, The Commission on the Free-
dom of the Press, whose seventeen members are unaffiliated with the
press, radio, and motion picture industries, are unanimously opposed
to the enactment of group libel statutes.67 On the other hand, the
American Jewish Congress, an organization which represents a group
which has felt the sting of unjustified and untruthful attacks, is one
of the leading proponents of such legislation. 8 Experiment under the
Illinois statute may prove whether the fears of this type of legislation
are well-founded, or whether such legislation can be of real value.
But the rise of the Nazis in the face of more stringent legislation than
America has ever seen, with the legislation often working to the ad-
vantage of those whom it sought to restrain, creates a presumption
against the effectiveness of group libel laws.69
THomAs P. LEwis
THE EFFECT OF THE NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY ACT ON
KENTUCKY'S GENERAL ASSIGNMENT LAW
It has long been held that state laws on insolvency are suspended
while the national Bankruptcy Act remains in effect.' Courts have dis-
agreed, however, as to exactly what constitutes an insolvency law.
Virtually all courts agree that a statute which merely regulates the
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